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Abstract
This paper shows how non-individualistic preferences can be individual tness
maximizing in the presence of general equilibrium externalities. In the model,
individuals share an endowment, which can be consumed on its own and/or used as a
means of exchange to purchase goods from merchants on the external market if such
exists. Assuming that increased consumption means increased individual tness, we
show that inequity-averse behavior with respect to endowment distribution can be
an optimal response to merchantsprice discrimination and lead to the evolution of
inequity-averse preferences. The ndings presented here are supported by empirical
evidence on the endogeniety of peoples preferences with respect to exposure to
market exchange.
1 Introduction
Vast empirical evidence on people sharing money shows that people seem to care, along-
side their own pecuniary interest, about the well-being of other parties a¤ected (for a
comprehensive review, see Fehr & Schmidt (2006)). Furthermore, cross-country studies
not only proved the ubiquity of other-regarding preferences but also showed that peo-
ples revealed preference for inequity aversion takes, with small deviations, a very similar
form across di¤erent countries (see, e.g., Roth et al. (1991)). This eventually led to the
thought that other-regarding preferences can be more characteristic of human nature than
selsh ones (see Fehr & Schmidt (1999); Bolton & Ockenfels (2000); Charness & Rabin
(2002) for popular representations of such preferences). However, as argued in Henrich
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(2000), the latter nding and conclusion need to be restricted only to modern industri-
alized societies. Henrich (2000) a study on the economic behavior of the Machiguenga
Indians of the Peruvian Amazon shows that the preferences of Machiguenga Indians re-
vealed in experiments are rather own-regarding than other-regarding, setting forth again
the question about the foundations of human behavior and sociality observed in modern
societies.
In order to see if the nding of Henrich (2000) constitutes a phenomenon beyond the
society studied, a large project was initiated to obtain more evidence on indigenous peo-
ples economic behavior from di¤erent small-scale traditional societies around the world.
Arguably, by studying traditional societies it allows us to look at modern peoples prefer-
ences as of an early stage of social cohabiting the foundations of human sociality and
the further evolution of those preferences. This project, documented in Henrich et al.
(2001) and Henrich et al. (2004), consisted of carrying out economic experiments with
members of the traditional societies studied, and one of its main ndings is the existence
of several between-group di¤erences in peoples revealed amount of sociality. One of the
discovered di¤erences, which is going to be the object of this paper, is that members of
a market-integrated society (as measured, primarily, by the societys exposure to market
exchange) behave on average more pro-socially (i.e., share more with others) than do
members of an isolated society. To put it di¤erently, the appearance of peoples revealed
preferences seems to be inuenced by the socioeconomic environment they live in. As
such, the appearance of preferences observed may not perfectly reveal peoples intrin-
sic nature and their truepreferences (of which people can be ignorant themselves).1
Henrich et al. (2004, p.5051) leave open the question of what explains the discovered
empirical pattern, calling for more research on this important nding, and the current
paper attempts to contribute toward a better understanding of this.
In this paper, we o¤er an evolutionary argument for the endogeneity of peoples pref-
erences documented in Henrich et al. (2004). In particular, we present a model in which
a societys exposure to market exchange can favor the evolution of inequity-averse pref-
erences for money distribution, whereas selsh preferences prevail in isolated societies.
The main idea is that in a society with market exchange inequity aversion with respect
to money distribution can attenuate the scope of merchantsprice discrimination and,
subsequently, improve terms of trade with merchants ultimately leading to higher con-
sumption levels of the societys members. Then, assuming that increased consumption
means increased individual tness (reproductive success), inequity-averse preferences for
1Among other evidence on the endogeneity of peoples preferences, Buchan et al. (2002) document
cross-cultural di¤erences in peoples propensity to trust and reciprocate. Herrmann et al. (2008) report
a cross-societal variation in peoples pro- and anti-social punishment behavior revealed in public goods
experiments and link this variation to di¤erences in norms of civic cooperation and the importance of the
rule of law across countries. Bowles (1998) o¤ers a systematic review of related theoretical and empirical
literature.
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money distribution can be individual tness (i.e., own consumption) maximizing and
eventually be favored by natural or rather cultural selection (through enculturation).
As a simple example, illustrating the main idea of the paper, consider an extended
two-player dictator game with consumption. Let the dictator be randomly chosen from
the two identical players (individuals) to split a monetary endowment of size 1 given
exogenously. Suppose that the endowment distribution resulting from a split is public
information, but the playersindividual endowment shares are their private information.
An individuals utility from his own endowment share is measured in the number of the
units consumed of the only non-divisible good available on the external market that the
individuals share can a¤ord. On the external market, there is a monopolist producer,
who produces the good at some constant marginal cost of, say, c = 0:1. After learning
about the endowment distribution, the producer charges the price for a unit of the good
that maximizes her prots from following simultaneous trades with the two individuals.
Within the setting described, we raise the question of what is the optimal sharing rule
maximizing the dictators consumption? Obviously, it is not optimal for the dictator to
keep all the endowment for himself. Because if he does so, the producer targets only the
rich individual, i.e., the dictator, by setting the price equal to the size of the endowment,
i.e., to 1, leaving the dictator with only one unit of the good consumed. Instead, the
dictator could increase his consumption by giving the other individual a portion of the
endowment large enough to make the prot-maximizing producer set the price aimed at
both individuals, which would leave the richer one the dictator with some consumer
surplus (or rather information rent) and more units consumed. (In our example, if the
dictator gives the other individual 1=3 keeping 2=3 of the endowment for himself, then
the producer nds it optimal to set the price equal to 1=3, and the dictator enjoys two
units consumed.) Hence, from a conventional utility function for consumption we obtain
a non-monotonic indirect utility function of money, which can be interpreted as having
underlying inequity-averse preferences for money distribution. The intuition behind this
result is that by sharing with others one can acquire information rent and, consequently,
increase the purchasing power of ones own, even diminished, share.
In the paper, we develop the above idea into a formal model with evolution of pref-
erences. The essential feature of the model is that we measure evolutionary tness not
in terms of monetary returns, which are the direct object of peoples decision making,
but in terms of the consumption that those monetary returns can later a¤ord. More
precisely, in our model individuals possess subjective preferences for money distribution,
which they maximize when they need to share money (an endowment in the model).
But individualsobjective payo¤s, or their objective utility with underlying objective
preferences, stem from the consumption levels that their own money shares resulted
from their actions (dictated, respectively, by their subjective preferences) lead to. Then,
we raise the question what subjective preferences generate the highest objective payo¤s
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and, correspondingly, survive evolutionary pressures.2 As we show, because of general
equilibrium externalities ensuing from a societys exposure to market exchange, inequity-
averse preferences for money distribution can render a higher consumption level than
that rendered by individualistic preferences and, correspondingly, the former are favored
by natural or cultural selection.
We use an evolutionary approach in order to relax the rationality assumption à la
homo economicusand allow individuals to maximize their subjective preferences rather
than their objective preferences, which, nevertheless, determine the playersreproduction
success. While we adopt the indirectevolutionary approach (see Güth & Yaari (1992);
Ely & Yilankaya (2001)), when showing that the equilibrium play of the game in question
is evolutionary stable, the standard approach (Weibull (1995)) would render the same
results, too. In fact, in our setting the two approaches are interchangeable, allowing us
to relate the ndings obtained with the literature on both approaches.
This paper also contributes to the evolutionary literature by providing a distinct and
empirically supported argument on how non-individualistic preferences in the individual
selection framework may survive evolutionary pressures. Typically, evolutionary models
in favor of non-individualistic preferences have required either a group-selection argument
in the standard approach (for a review, see Bergstrom (2002)) or certain informational
assumptions about the observability of the playerspreferences in the indirectapproach
(for a concrete example, see Bester & Güth (1998); for a more general argument, see
Dekel et al. (2007)). This paper, however, bypasses all of the above: the result primarily
hinges on general equilibrium e¤ects.3 Therefore, this paper instead falls into the game
of lifeparadigm, arguing that peoples behavior should be examined in a wider social
context (see Binmore (1994, 1998); or Güth & Napel (2006) for an example related to
the evolution of inequity-averse preferences).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 expands the example
given above into a more general model and solves it. Section 3 discusses the results
obtained, links them to empirical studies, and o¤ers possible extensions. The last section
concludes the study.
2In a similar fashion, Huck & Oechssler (1999) develop an evolutionary argument for revengeful
behavior presuming that the individual subjective payo¤ and subsequent evolutionary tness resulting
from strategies employed are not equivalent. The general models of evolution of preferences (see Ely &
Yilankaya (2001); Ok & Vega-Redondo (2001); Dekel et al. (2007)) also di¤erentiate between peoples
subjective and objective preferences.
3Certainly, this paper is not unique in showing how individual selection can favor pro-social prefer-
ences. For instance, Becker (1976) presents a model in which egoists take actions as though they had
altruistic preferences in order to benet from othersaltruism.
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2 Model
2.1 Framework
Suppose that the land rewards a group of farmers with a publicly observed harvest surplus,
henceforth, the endowment S, which the farmers share among themselves. If used for own
consumption, an endowment share s 2 [0; S] renders a farmer the material payo¤of U0(s);
U0s > 0, U
0
ss < 0. In the event the group is exposed to external trades, endowment shares
can also be used as a means of exchange, i.e., as money, to purchase goods frommerchants.
It is assumed that every farmer has a demand for at most one unit of external goods, and
that the endowment distribution within the group, ensuing after an endowment split, is
public information, while individual shares are only privately known.4
Suppose that merchants can o¤er one type of goods the good which, on the other
hand, can be produced in various quality q, greater than or equal to some q
¯
> 05, with
the production function C(q); Cq > 0; Cqq > 0, and the returns to scale from producing
a given variety being constant. The merchants o¤er the farmers a menu of price-quality
(p; q) bundles of the good to choose from, where the price p is gauged in terms of the
endowment. When o¤ering bundles of the good, the merchants aim to maximize their
expected prots (returns less production costs), and for that they take into account
the income distribution observed within the group, farmersunit demand, and market
competition, described more precisely below.
The consumption of a (p; q) variety of the good and of the remainder of an endowment
share s renders a farmer the material payo¤ of UG(s   p; q); UG1 > 0; UG11 < 0; UG2 >
0; UG22 < 0; U
G
12 > 0. A farmer will consider purchasing a variety (p; q) only if it results
in a non-negative net utility level U , dened as U(q; s; p)  UG(s   p; q)   U0(s) with
its properties being Us > 0; Uss < 0; Uq > 0; Uqq < 0; and Uqs > 0.6 Furthermore, given
a menu of price-quality bundles, farmers are assumed to choose the bundle, if any, that
maximizes their net utility U . For analytical convenience, let the function U be of the
4In the framework described, the farmersare chosen to allude to the historical division of labor into
farmers, nomads, and merchants, which could potentially serve as a real lifeexample in the subsequent
argument about the evolution of inequity-averse preferences for money distribution. In addition, with
farmereconomy it is intended to refer to the traditional societies in Henrich et al. (2004), from which
comes the empirical support for the results of the model.
5This condition is for modeling purposes only and is made to have well dened consumption bundles
in further analysis.
6All the listed properties of the utility function U are related to consumer preferences for normal
goods (as in, e.g., Mas-Colell et al. (1995)). In particular, the positive partial derivative Us implies
that a richer individual derives a higher utility from the consumption of the good (due to, say, smaller
opportunity costs). Similarly, the positive cross derivative Uqs can be interpreted as meaning that a
richer consumer values quality more, which can be motivated by the convexity of the Engel curves for
high-quality goods.
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quasi-linear form in the price p :
U(q; s; p) = V (q; s)  p; (1)
but the numerical example following the analytical part considers a more general case.
Finally, we consider three di¤erent scenarios of the external market structure: 1) mer-
chants are absent (the farmerseconomy is autarkic), 2) monopoly (there is a monopolist
merchant), and 3) perfect competition (there are many competing merchants).
2.2 Game and natural selection
Along the lines of the above framework, consider a large population of farmers randomly
and repeatedly (after the endowment is consumed) matched into separate groups of two
farmers, and every group is endowed with the same-size endowment S. In a group,
Nature randomly selects a farmer to be the dictator,who is to divide the endowment
into shares s 2 [0; S] for himself and (S   s) for the other farmer at own discretion.7
Suppose that farmers have subjective preferences for endowment distribution (or money
distribution), characterized by the subjective utility function US with preference type
~s 2 [0; S] such that the (subjective) utility from an endowment share s, accrued to a
farmer with a preference type ~s, is
US(s; ~s) =   js  ~sj : (2)
Therefore, in what follows, a farmer of preference type ~s, when selected to be the dictator,
always keeps ~s for himself, leaving S ~s for the other farmer in the match.8 Next, suppose
that in the population subjective preference types are initially distributed according to
some non-degenerate distribution over the whole type space [0; S].
The objective payo¤s from a split, or the evolutionary tness, are measured by the
resulting material payo¤s U0 or UG, which, on the other hand, depend both on the
own-endowment share and on the menu of consumption bundles o¤ered on the external
market. The farmers, however, cannot discern for themselves what material payo¤s their
actions over endowment split result in. Instead, they can be thought of as living behind
the veil of ignorance about external markets or about what global game they are
part of, and, therefore, they just divide the endowment according to their subjective
7As for the endowment sharing rule, we adopt the dictator-game framework, which is done mainly
for modeling convenience; the main results are also robust against other modeling frameworks, e.g., that
of the ultimatum game. What matters in the end is the presence of general equilibrium e¤ects.
8While we are following the indirect evolutionary approach (Güth & Yaari (1992) and Ely &
Yilankaya (2001)), alternatively, we could think of the farmers as being pre-programmed to split the
endowment according to their preference types as in standard evolutionary models, see Weibull (1995).
Due to the specicity of the game studied, the two approaches would render identical results, which is
not necessarily the case in general (e.g., Huck & Oechssler (1999)).
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preferences only. Signicantly, knowledge of other farmerspreferences or the population
distribution of preferences will not play any role in this game, although that is not
generally the case (see, e.g., Ok & Vega-Redondo (2001) or Dekel et al. (2007)). Next,
for modeling convenience, merchants are assumed to design consumption bundles for
every match separately, and these bundles are not available to the farmers from other
matches. With merchants assumed to design bundles in the prot maximizing way and
farmers assumed to choose the own-utility-maximizing one, this sequential structure of
the model allows us to prunethe production and consumption stages and to consider
the reduced game only, i.e., the dictator game, where the external market structure and
merchantsoptimal play are embodied in the farmersmaterial payo¤ function.
As already specied above, we distinguish three cases of merchantsmarket: autarky,
the monopolist market, and the perfectly competitive market each giving rise to a dis-
tinct farmer material payo¤ function and we analyze the three cases in three di¤erent
games  A; M ; and  C , respectively. In each game, there are two players (two farm-
ers), their action space is to choose an endowment share s 2 [0; S] for himself, leaving
the other player S   s. Each player has subjective preferences over an endowment split
(s; S s), characterized by his subjective parameter ~s 2 [0; S] and the utility function US
dened in (2), which he maximizes when selected to divide the endowment into shares.
But at the same time, the playersmaterial payo¤s (evolutionary tness) stemming from
their actions are measured in the utility levels U0 or UG resulting from the a¤ordable
consumption that their actions lead to, as will be precisely dened below for each game
separately.
Then, for each game we tackle the question of what subjective preferences yield the
greatest material payo¤s and, accordingly, will be favored by natural selection, with their
population share increasing at the expense of other less successful preferences. We adopt
the indirect evolutionary approach with a static stability concept of equilibrium so
that in equilibrium no mutation can give a higher (material) payo¤ than that of the
incumbent types. Based on the results of Ely & Yilankaya (2001) and applying them to
our games studied, evolution selects those subjective preferences or, equivalently, actions
over an endowment split that constitute an equilibrium of the game in question dened in
terms of expected material payo¤s. And we call those subjective preferences evolutionary
stable.9 In what follows, by an equilibrium of a game we mean an equilibrium in material
payo¤s.
9Ely & Yilankaya (2001) studies nite games, while in our model the action space is allowed to be
innite: s 2 [0; S]. However, since we design our games in such a way that the existence of equilibrium is
not an issue, then the results of Ely & Yilankaya (2001) apply to our setting as well despite a continuous
action space. Alternatively, we could make our games studied nite by simply discretizing the players
action and preference spaces, and then the results of Ely & Yilankaya (2001) would apply directly.
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2.3 Equilibrium play in a match
Case 1: Autarky
Consider game  A, where the farmers are not exposed to any external trades, making it
a standard two-player dictator game. The material payo¤ from an endowment share s is
U0(s); given the optimal play of the players (with respect to their subjective preferences),
the expected material payo¤ to a farmer of preference type ~s when matched with a farmer
of preference type ~s0 is
A(~s; ~s0) = 0:5U0(~s) + 0:5U0(S   ~s0):
More generally, given a population distribution of subjective preferences F , the expected
material payo¤ in population (evolutionary tness) to a farmer of preference type ~s is
dened as
A(~s) = 0:5U0(~s) + 0:5E~s02C(F )U0(S   ~s0);
where C(F ) is the support of the distribution F , and E is the expectations operator.
Since the second term of the above tness expression does not depend on the own-
preference type, the farmers of type ~s = S attain the highest tness because of U0s > 0.
Hence, the equilibrium of game  A (the evolutionary stable strategy prole) is to keep
the whole endowment resulting in the endowment split (S; 0) which implies that in
autarky selsh types (~s = S) would prevail.
Case 2: Monopoly
In game  M , in order to specify the playersmaterial payo¤s from their actions, rst,
we need to solve for the optimal consumption bundles o¤ered by the monopolist prot-
maximizing merchant given endowment distribution. From the merchants perspective,
it is a mechanism design problem with hidden information, for a potential customers
wealth, i.e., his endowment share, is his private information. Once the menu of bundles
is set, it is not subject to change, by which we rule out the possibility of the merchants
updating her beliefs about prospective buyerswealth distribution after some trade has
taken place (alternatively, we could assume that at the last stage only one trade with a
random farmer takes place). The exposition of the merchants problem closely follows
Mussa & Rosen (1978).
Merchants problem
After the endowment in a match is divided between the two farmers, the merchant learns
about the ensuing endowment shares s1 and s2, s1  s2, and, accordingly, maximizes her
expected prot 0:5(p1 C(q1))+0:5(p2 C(q2)) with respect to price-quality bundles of the
good f(p1; q1); (p2; q2)g, where the second bundle is aimed at the richer farmer (and the
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assumption is that every farmer has a demand for at most one unit of the good). There is
no need to state the problem and solve it formally, for the solution to this type of problem
is well established in the contract theory literature once specic conditions are met (such
as the single-crossing property, which in our model is ensured by the assumption of the
positive cross derivative of net utility function U; Uqs > 0). Hence, below we immediately
proceed with describing the results for various scenarios of endowment split.
In the special case of the equal endowment split s1 = s2 = S=2, the merchant o¤ers
one price-quality allocation (p1; q1) = (p2; q2) = (p; q) such that
Cq(q) = Vq(q; s2); (3)
p = V (q; s2); (4)
which coincides with the rst-best allocation under symmetric information, where con-
sumers are left with no consumer surplus.
For an uneven split, s1 < s2, two cases need to be distinguished depending on what
the merchant nds optimal: 1) to serve both farmers and 2) to ignore the poorer farmer
and serve only the richer farmer. When the merchant serves both farmers, the optimal
price-quality bundles (p1; q1) and (p2; q2) are found from
Cq(q2) = Vq(q2; s2); (5)
Cq(q1) = 2Vq(q1; s1)  Vq(q1; s2); (6)
for the quantities q1 and q2; and the prices follow from
U(q1; s1; p1) = 0;
U(q2; s2; p2) = U(q1; s2; p1);
where the last two expressions are the binding individual rationality constraint of the
poorer type (s1) and incentive compatibility constraint of the richer type (s2), respectively.
In this case, the richer farmer enjoys the information rent of size U(q2; s2; p2), while the
poorer one is left with none. The condition for both farmers to be served is that the
quality q1 from (6) needs to be greater than or equal to the lowest feasible quality level q
¯
,
or the poorer farmers endowment share s1 to be greater than or equal to the threshold
share s dened as
s = fs1 : ~q1(s1) = q
¯
g; (7)
where ~q1(s1) is the quality mapping from share s1 to quality q1 as found from (6), where
s2 is replaced with S   s1.
Hence, in the event of an endowment split s1 < s, the merchant does not serve the
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poorer farmer, but o¤ers the rst-best allocation to the richer farmer as in (3) and (4),
thus, leaving the latter with no information rent.
Evolutionary tness
As before, in game  M it is the playersexpected material payo¤s their evolutionary
tness that dene the equilibria of the game. Given a population distribution of sub-
jective preferences F , the evolutionary tness of a player of preference type ~s is
M(~s) = 0:5Y (~s) + 0:5E~s02C(F )Y (S   ~s0); (8)
where C(F ) is the support of the distribution F , and E is the expectations operator,
and Y is the indirect utility function, which maps a players endowment share into the
resultant material payo¤ accounting for the merchants optimal play. In particular, a
players indirect utility Y of an endowment share s (with the other players share being
S   s) is dened by
Y (s) =
8><>:
U0(s) if s  S=2;
U0(s) + U(q2; s; p2) if S=2 < s  S   s;
U0(s) if S   s < s  S;
(9)
where (p2; q2) is the price-quality allocation aimed at the richer player (farmer) as dened
above (which is itself a function of an endowment share s); and s is the threshold endow-
ment share as in (7) that provides the condition when both farmers are served. A farmer
obtains the highest evolutionary tness M when his indirect utility Y is maximized.
From function denition (9), we see that there is an upward shift U(q2; s; p2) in the
values of indirect utility function Y over (S=2; S   s], which, otherwise, takes the form
of reservation utility U0(s) only. As discussed above, when inequality in endowment
distribution is not too sharp and because of which the merchant nds it optimal to
serve both farmers, the richer farmer enjoys the information rent of U(q2; s; p2), which
is, otherwise, fully extracted by the merchant. Denote the maximizer of the function Y
over the interval (S=2; S   s] by s. Since no information rents are available after the
point s = S   s, which occurs when the merchant optimally shuts down on the poorer
farmer, it is not clear where the function Y achieves its global maximum: at s = s or at
s = S. In other words, it is not obvious from the material payo¤ perspective whether the
dictator should keep all the endowment for himself (and maximize his reservation utility
U0) or give away the share S   s to the other farmer (and enjoy some information rent).
It depends on the size of information rent, which, on the other hand, is dependent on the
form of the utility functions. Formally, if
U0(s) + U(q2; s; p2) > U
0(S);
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or
UG(q2; s  p2) > U0(S); (10)
where (p2; q2) is the allocation aimed at the richer farmer for the endowment split (s; S s),
then the dictator attains the highest material payo¤when he shares the endowment with
the other farmer (by giving the latter S s). Intuitively, it is to require that farmers after
a certain point become quickly satiated with the consumption of their own endowment
(which is their lands produce) and value the outside good highly enough. (See the
numerical example following this subsection that illustrates the points raised above.)
Returning to evolutionary tness expression (8), we see that if condition (10) holds,
the farmers of preference type ~s = s acquire the highest expected material payo¤. In other
words, when the farmers are exposed to external trades run by a monopolist merchant,
inequity-averse preferences for money distribution can result in higher utility levels from
consumption and, eventually, be favored by natural or cultural selection (to o¤set the
merchants monopoly power). All in all, the equilibrium split in game  M is (s; S   s)
when condition (10) holds; otherwise, it is (S; 0).
Case 3: Perfect competition
Consider game  C , where there are many competing merchants on the external market.
Given that all merchantsprots have to be equal to 0 in perfect competition, the com-
petitive solution to a merchants problem is easy to describe. The level of quality o¤ered
has to be as in the rst-best case, while the price has to be equal to the total cost of
producing that particular quality. Therefore, the price-quality allocation (pj; qj) aimed
at a farmer with an endowment share sj is determined by (3) for the quality qj, and the
price is set by pj = C(qj), which, unlike in the monopoly case, is not a function of the
endowment share sj. Therefore, the selsh farmers with ~s = S attain the highest material
payo¤ in game  C , and this type of preference should survive evolutionary pressures.
Summary
The proposition below summarizes the resultant evolutionary stable preferences for the
environments analyzed.
Proposition 1 In the two-player dictator games with consumption studied above,  A,
 M , and  C, the evolutionary stable preference types ~ses with respect to endowment dis-
tribution are, respectively,
 in game  A, autarky,  ~ses = S;
 in game  M , external trades run by a monopolist merchant,  if condition (10)
holds, then ~ses = s, where s = argmax(Y (s) j S=2 < s  S   s) and the indirect
utility function Y is dened by (9); otherwise, ~ses = S; and
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 in game  C, external trades run by competitive merchants,  ~ses = S:
2.4 Numerical example
Here we illustrate the results obtained for the case with the monopolist merchant. Con-
sider the following specication of the model. A farmers reservation utility of his own
endowment share s 2 [0; S] is given by U0(s) = sa, where 0 < a < 1; the utility from
the consumption of a (p; q) variety given a share s is UG(s   p; q) = (1 + q)(s   p)a,
and we have that UG(s   0; 0)  U0(s). The merchants production function is given
by C(q) = qb, where b > 1, q  q
¯
. Let the parameters take the following values: the
endowment S = 50; the production parameters b = 2 and q
¯
= 0:01, and we estimate
the results for three di¤erent values of consumption utility parameter a = 0:5; 0:7; and
0:9 that capture di¤erent signicance levels of endowment consumption for own material
utility.
With the above specication of the model, a closed-form solution to the merchants
problem is all but impossible to obtain (this is why in the analytical part above we use
a simplication that a farmers net utility U is of the quasi-linear form in the price p).
Instead, we revert to numerical methods to solve the model. Leaving aside the solution
details10, in Figure 1 below we present the results in the form of the plots of indirect
utility function Y , (9). On the X axis, we have own endowment shares s, and on the Y
axis we have the resultant utility levels Y given the merchants optimal play. The three
graphs plot the indirect utility levels for the three di¤erent consumption parameter a
values. The coordinates of maximum points are given in bold that are contrasted with
the coordinates of the other maximum candidate points. As we can see from the graph,
when the value of a is not too high, i.e., when farmers do not value own produce too
much relatively to the outside good, we have that farmers achieve the highest material
utility by sharing with one another (see the plots for a = 0:5 and 0:7). In general, it
can be shown that the lower the values the parameter a takes, the more farmers gain
from sharing. The condition equivalent to (10) when farmers are better o¤ sharing with
others is that a < 0:749.
3 Discussion
3.1 Appearance and evolution of inequity aversion
The main result of Proposition 1 is that external factors, such as market exchange and
market structure, can have an inuence on peoples behavior and the shape of their re-
vealed preferences. In particular, besides genuinely altruistic considerations for other peo-
10The model was solved using Matlab and its function fsolve to solve systems of nonlinear equations.
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ple (frequently adhered to when explaining experimental evidence on peoples behavior,
e.g., Levine (1998)), people may also develop inequity aversion toward money distribution
as an optimal (i.e., own-consumption-maximizing) response to merchantsprot-seeking
behavior. To put it di¤erently, the results obtained here can also be interpreted as: Even
if people are intrinsically selsh (with regard to their own consumption), they can still
exhibit behavior as if they had inequity-averse preferences for money distribution. In
other words, peoples revealed preferences may only be an appearance of peoples true
nature as of under certain circumstances and, correspondingly, may be subject to change
in response to changes in those circumstances (especially if we take the approach that
behavioral traits are transmitted culturally, say, through enculturation, rather than ge-
netically, see Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman (1981)). It is needless to say that the postulated
supercial appearance of peoples revealed preferences requires a very careful examination
and discussion, but which is beyond the aim of this paper.
In the evolutionary literature, the group-selection argument is typically used to show
how pro-social preferences can survive evolutionary pressures (see, e.g., Bergstrom (2002)).
Unlike in standard models, our argument in favor of pro-social preferences does not hinge
on the group-selection idea. Our explanation does not require that pro-social types of
people, when matched with people like them, receive high enough payo¤s to o¤set lower
payo¤s when matched with selsh types, thus, making their expected evolutionary tness
greater than that of the selsh types. Instead, our argument hinges on the idea that in
order to subdue a third partys adverse impact people may be individually better o¤ by
choosing pro-socialactions to the overall benet of the group they belong to.
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Needless to say, within the framework studied, other forms of evolutionary stable
preferences could emerge depending on the degree of competition or monopoly on the
market. A more general prediction would be that the more monopolist markets are, the
less selsh peoples preferences for money distribution should be, o¤ering an empirically
testable hypothesis on the link between market structure and peoples preferences, which
is left for future research. At the same time, there is empirical evidence in favor of the
model, which is sketched in the following subsection.
3.2 Empirical evidence
In empirical studies, it has been demonstrated that peoples preferences, revealed by their
exhibited behavior in sharing money, are not uniform across di¤erent societies and are
rather shaped by socioeconomic and cultural factors (see, e.g., Henrich et al. (2001);
Henrich et al. (2004); Buchan et al. (2002); Herrmann et al. (2008)). As already
noted in the introduction, the most compelling evidence in support of our theoretical
ndings comes from the project conducted in 15 small-scale traditional societies, which is
documented in Henrich et al. (2001) and Henrich et al. (2004). The aim of this project
was to look into the foundations of human sociality and its origins through studying
small-scale societies, which could possibly shed light on the evolutionary transition of
modern peoples preferences (which are, actually, less diverse, see Roth et al. (1991)).
Henrich et al. (2004) found that peoples preferences, revealed in playing the ulti-
matum, public good, and dictator games, di¤er across di¤erent groups, and that there
are certain regularities in the documented di¤erences. One of the regularities, relevant
to our model, is that members of an isolated society behave less pro-socially than do
members of a market-integrated society (as measured, primarily, by exposure to external
market exchange). Henrich et al. (2004), however, provided no theoretical explanation
for this important empirical nding, which is nonetheless fully in line with our theoretical
predictions, presented in Proposition 1. As already been said, our explanation for this
nding is that when people are exposed to external trades with merchants (who typically
possess or collude to possess some monopoly power), they are better o¤ by sharing with
others since it overcomes merchantsfull-rent extraction.
Certainly, to make this explanation more credible one would need to more closely
explore the relationship between market structure and preferences as, for instance, hy-
pothesized in the previous subsection.
3.3 Model extensions and research directions
Within a given society, the distribution of peoples preferences is more diverse than just
one type of preferences (see, e.g., Fehr & Schmidt (1999)). In our model in particular, for
game  M with condition (10) being met to achieve a non-trivial distribution of evolution-
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ary stable preferences, we could elaborate by introducing a noisy signal that merchants
receive about the income distribution resulting from an endowment split and depending
on which they design consumption bundles. Then, due to the noisiness of a signal, there
would be no single type of subjective preference that would be own-consumption max-
imizing for any realization of a signal. Instead, di¤erent types of subjective preference
would be evolutionary-tness maximizing for di¤erent realizations of a signal, leading,
eventually, to a more diverse distribution of evolutionary stable preferences. Similarly,
we could subject the structure of the external market to di¤erent competitive shocks,
which would also lead to a more diverse distribution of evolutionary stable preferences.
In a similar fashion, we can think of other mechanisms a¤ecting the form of revealed
(inequity-averse) preferences. For instance, within our model, consider the e¤ect on peo-
ples optimal (i.e., own-consumption-maximizing) behavior after the introduction of a
uniform sales tax on the outside good. If the public authority aims to maximize tax rev-
enues, then the model would predict people responding to the tax by reducing inequality
in wealth on the grounds similar to the case with a monopolist merchant. On the other
hand, if the tax imposed by the public authority is negligible, then it would not have any
impact on peoples behavior. In other words, the importance of the governments role in
the economy can also shape the appearance of peoples preferences, with its more central
role adding to inequity aversion among people.
An interesting extension would also be to consider an Nplayer dictator game, where
the number of farmers, matched to play the dictator game, is larger than two (similarly
to the framework in Ok & Vega-Redondo (2001)). Qualitatively, it should not change
the results: in certain cases, inequity-averse preferences should still render the highest
material payo¤. Interestingly, in game  M it may not be optimal (from the material
payo¤ perspective) for the dictator to split the remaining endowment evenly among the
rest of the players, provided he nds it optimal to give away some of the endowment.
Instead, the dictator can do better by dividing the remaining endowment unevenly as
it can be seen from the special case of N = 3 and V (q; s) = qs, which at the same
time poses an interesting question of what is the optimal income distribution from the
dictators perspective in the game with more than two players.
4 Concluding remarks
We have argued that the inequity-averse preferences of the type documented in labora-
tory experiments may be a product of natural or cultural selection. It has been shown
that inequity aversion to money distribution can be developed as an optimal response
to the surrounding socioeconomic environment monopolistic merchandise markets, for
instance.
The ndings presented herein can be thought of as an attempt to reconcile experi-
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mental evidence on peoples preferences for money distribution (or subjective preferences
using the terminology of the paper) with the conventional modeling assumption about the
own-regarding preferences underlying material utility (or objective preferences), which, as
this paper shows, can be consistent with each other. To go further, this paper can also of-
fer an additional insight into the problem of what preferences should be used in economic
modeling. For instance, if we are to think that the (subjective) preferences revealed in
experimental and eld studies are reective of more general behavioral traits, then in
the partial-equilibrium or short-horizon analysis of decision making problems using the
revealed (subjective) preferences would probably render more accurate predictions than
would using the objective ones. However, if, for example, a modeled policy change has
a substantial general equilibrium reach, then, along the lines of the model presented, it
may also a¤ect the form of peoples subjective preferences through the social transmission
of (more successful) behavioral traits. Then, using the subjective preferences to predict
the long-run outcome of the modeled change would probably render less accurate results
than would using the objective preferences.
Finally, to make the results of this paper more credible, more empirical research needs
to be done on the interdependence between peoples preferences and the environment
they live in. In particular, one could examine the link between market concentration and
peoples preferences hypothesized here by regressing a market concentration index on a
measure of inequity aversion across di¤erent countries.
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